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Abstract: In this  paper, I  argue that hinge propositions are ways of acting that constitute abilities or skills.
My starting point  is Moyal-Sharrock's  account  of hinge propositions.  However,  Moyal-Sharrock's  account
leaves gaps to be filled, as it does not offer a unified explanation of the origin of our ungrounded grounds. Her
account also lacks resources to respond to the issue of demarcation, since it does not provide a criterion for
distinguishing ways of acting that can legitimately fulfill  the role of ungrounded  grounds from those that
cannot. Without an answer to this issue, the relativistic threat is serious. I then propose that by narrowing the
ways of acting to those that are constitutive of abilities, we can deal with the relativistic threat. I provide an
ecological  approach to abilities through which I explain why abilities are reality-soaked and therefore why
the ways of acting that constitute them are legitimate ungrounded grounds. Based on that approach, I provide
an answer to the issue of demarcation that defuses the relativistic threat.
Keywords: hinge epistemology, ecological psychology, abilities, relativism, Moyal-Sharrock.
"Giving  grounds,  however,  justifying  the  evidence,  comes  to  an  end;—but  the  end  is  not
certain propositions' striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our part;
it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game”—Wittgenstein.
1. Introduction
In On Certainty (1969), Wittgenstein offers us a radical image of the structure of reasons. At
the base of this image are hinge propositions such as “I have two hands,” “I have a body,”
“The Earth has existed for many years,” “There are physical objects” etc. They are qualified
as “the ground is  not true,  nor yet  false” (1969, §205),  “an ungrounded way of acting”
(1969,  §110),  "something  that  lies  beyond  being  justified  or  unjustified;  as  it  were,  as
something animal" (1969, §359), propositions that “must be solid for us” (1969, §112), that
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we don’t arrive at “as a result of investigation” (1969, §138), that “are exempt from doubt,
are as it were like hinges on which those turn” (1969, §341), that are certain although not
known (1969, §151),  that form “the starting-point of belief for me” (1969, §209) and that
are acquired by a process of enculturation, the child “swallows this consequence [the  hinge
proposition] down, so to speak, together with what it learns” (1969, §143). Taken together,
these propositions would structure our investigations and determine what is evidence for
what. They are certain not because they are known or because they are based on evidence,
but rather because they are the condition for something to be known or based on evidence.
On the one hand, the image offered by  Wittgenstein seems to indicate a way out of the
classic skeptical problem of the regress of justifications, even though there is dispute over
whether what he offers is a new version of foundationalism (Moyal-Sharrock, 2004; Stroll,
1994,  p.  75-80)  or  a  dissolution  of  the  problem  that  gives  rise  to  the  regress
(Schönbaumsfeld, 2016). Are ungrounded certainties a legitimate stop to the regress or a
limit to the doubts that can pressure the demand for justification? On the other hand, it is
argued that  hinge propositions are incapable of  facing the skeptical  challenge precisely
because they are  ungrounded,  and therefore  lack any epistemic quality (Fogelin,  1994;
Pritchard, 2012). Furthermore, as these propositions are assimilated by an enculturation
process and can vary from culture to culture (Wittgenstein, 1969, §262), the problem of
demarcation arises (Coliva, forthcoming), after all, which propositions can play the role of
ungrounded grounds?  Without  an answer to  this  problem,  we would at  best  trade the
skeptical threat for the relativistic threat.
This ambiguity as to what Wittgenstein's picture of the structure of reasons actually offers
us is due, in part, to the difficulty of finding an interpretation that makes everything he says
about  hinge  propositions  coherent and  harmonious.  For  example,  the  first  three
qualifications given at the beginning of this section suggest that hinge propositions are not
properly propositions,  at least if  we assume that propositions must have a truth value.
They would be more like commands or ways of acting. But at other times, Wittgenstein
claims that they take the form of empirical propositions (1969, §136) and at least seems to
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suggest that they are a special kind of proposition (1969, §494), while at the same time
acknowledging that the “concept 'proposition' itself is not a sharp one” (1969, §320). It is
not surprising, therefore, that there is a vast and rich literature on how to interpret hinge
propositions. Duncan Pritchard (2015) distinguishes at least four interpretative currents:
the  externalist,  the  non-propositional,  the  non-doxastic  and  the  epistemic  entitlement
interpretation.
In this text, I will not address the exegetical issue. I am not concerned with offering an
interpretation  that  makes  Wittgenstein's  claims  about  hinge  propositions  mutually
coherent and harmonious. I'm going to propose a way of understanding hinge propositions
that  does  justice  to  their  role  of  ungrounded  ground.  My  proposal  is  by  no  means
unprecedented.  I  will  take  the  non-propositional  interpretation  articulated  by  Danièle
Moyal-Sharrock (2015) and complement it by approximating the assimilation of a hinge
proposition  to  the  assimilation  of  an  ability  as  understood  by  ecological  psychology
(Carvalho, 2019b, 2020a). More specifically, I propose that the ways of acting that Moyal-
Sharrock associates with hinge propositions are to be taken as constitutive of abilities. The
ecological  approach to abilities, I will argue, offers an explanation of why certain ways of
acting  become  so  entrenched  and  basic  and  therefore  why  they  acquire  the  role  of
ungrounded ground. I will also argue that this proposal offers an answer to the problem of
demarcation, thus avoiding  the charge of relativism. On another occasion, when drafting
the proposal, I dubbed it "ability reading” (Carvalho, 2019a). To be more exact, I will call it
“ability proposal”.
In the next Section, I present Moyal-Sharrock's interpretation. In Section 3, I put forward
the demarcation problem and  argue that  Moyal-Sharrock's  interpretation does not deal
well with the demarcation problem. In Section 4, divided into three subsections, I present
my  proposal  for  understanding  hinge  propositions.  In  Subsection  4.1,  I  articulate  the
ecological approach to abilities; in Subsection 4.2, I explore the suggestion of taking hinge
propositions as constitutive of abilities; and, in Subsection 4.3, I show how my proposal
addresses the problem of demarcation. Finally, in Section 5, I end with some final remarks. 
3
2. The non-propositional interpretation
As mentioned above,  Moyal-Sharrock proposes that  hinge propositions are not  actually
propositions.  She  comes  to  this  conclusion  by  assuming  a  very  strict  conception  of
proposition and which supposedly would have followed wittgenstein unchanged from the
Tractatus to his posthumous work on certainty (Moyal-Sharrock, 2020).2 According to this
account, an essential characteristic of propositions is bipolarity, they must be capable of
being true and capable of being false.3 As, it is alleged, hinge propositions are neither true
nor false (Wittgenstein, 1990, §205), then they are not propositions per se.
According to Moyal-Sharrock,  hinge propositions share a series of other characteristics,
they are:  non-epistemic,  indubitable,  non-empirical,  grammatical,  ineffable,  enacted and
foundational (2004, p. 72–99; 2015, p. 8). “Hinge” propositions are non-epistemic because
they  are  not  the  conclusion  of  an  investigation  or  argument,  nor  are  they  based  on
evidence, they are ungrounded. If they were grounded, a request for justification or doubt
could be raised about their  grounding. Hence, hinge propositions are  indubitable. If they
were true or false, then the negation of a hinge proposition would be conceivable and open
to  the  possibility  of  error  and,  therefore,  of  doubt.  However,  a  possibility  of  error  is
precisely  what  we  cannot  conceive  of  in  relation  to  hinge  propositions.  Except  in
exceptional circumstances, for example, if a bomb explodes nearby, there is no room for
error  as  to  having  two  hands,  “if  Moore  were  to  pronounce  the  opposite  of  those
propositions which he declares certain, we should not just not share his opinion: we should
regard him as demented” (Wittgenstein, 1969, §155). The certainty that I have two hands is
not empirical either, it is not based on experience. Seeing my two hands does not prove or
provide  evidence  that  I  have  two  hands,  although  it  could  be  evidence  that  I  am  not
hallucinating or that my perception is functioning normally. If I didn't see them, I wouldn't
conclude  that  I  don't  have  two hands,  but  that  I  have  a  perceptual  problem.  Precisely
because it  is  a  ground that  does not require justification,  the certainty that  I  have two
2 It’s controversial whether Wittgenstein maintained the same view of propositions throughout his works. For
a discussion of this point, see Coliva (Forthcoming).
3 Bipolarity is distinguished from bivalence, the latter being the characteristic that a proposition has a single
truth value between two possible ones. Tautologies and contradictions satisfy bivalence but not bipolarity.
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hands  determines  that  not  being  able  to  see  my  hands  under  normal  conditions  of
observation is evidence for the occurrence of an issue in the perceptual system.
The three features we have just discussed do not yet make it sufficiently clear what takes
the place of propositions since hinge propositions are not exactly propositions per se, but
the  following  three  characteristics  may  help  us  in  this  task.  “Hinge”  propositions  are
grammatical in the broad sense that they are rules that fix how language should be used,
they stipulate “the conditions of intelligibility of a language” (Moyal-Sharrock, 2020, p. 40).
In the same way that "A rod has a length" is a preparation for measuring and describing the
length of a particular  rod, "I have a body,” "I have two hands," "There are other people
besides  myself,"  “Physical  objects  exist”  etc.  are  preparations for  the  intelligible  use  of
language. They are not propositions, as they are neither true nor false, they are rules that
delimit what does and what does not make sense, they offer us a framework that "allows us
to  use  words  in  order  to  intelligibly  represent,  describe,  express,  misrepresent,
misdescribe, imagine, pretend, lie about, etc. how things are” (2020, p. 41). As rules that
delimit what does and does not make sense, they themselves do not make sense. This has
to do with Wittgenstein's narrow conception of proposition, “only falsifiable propositions
to have sense, grammatical rules (in that they are unfalsifiable) are nonsense” (2004, p.
90).
Therefore,  they  are  also  ineffable.  Because  they  are  outside  of  language,  making  our
language  games  possible,  hinge  propositions,  as  grammatical  rules,  are  not  possible
movements within these games. Therefore, it makes no sense to state them (2004, p. 94).
That's why it's strange when Moore says “Here is a hand” while looking at one of his hands.
In this situation, there is no intelligible statement that he could make with the utterance of
this  sentence.  Of  course  there  may  be  situations  where  the  utterance of  this  sentence
makes sense. In a game in which we are invited to look for and identify drawings of hands
that are, so to speak, “camouflaged” in an image, “Here is a hand” informs where in the
drawing the person looking can find a hand. In this case, “Here is a hand” does not work as
a hinge proposition, this sentence is a doppelgänger of the hinge proposition and fulfills a
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non-grammatical function (2004, p. 93). It makes perfect sense to inform and describe, in
this  situation,  where  a  hand  can  be  found.  But  this  is  not  the  intended,  and  indeed
impossible, use by Moore of informing that something outside of him, a hand, exists. The
doppelgänger,  but  not  the  corresponding  hinge  proposition,  does  indeed  express  a
proposition, and may be falsified, perhaps the speaker was mistaken as to whether there
was a hand-drawn in the intended or pointed place. 
As for the hinge proposition,  it  can be articulated as a rule only in heuristic  situations,
when, for example, we want to teach a child or someone who does not speak our language
how to use the word “hand”. However, it is important to emphasize that, in these situations,
the sentence that articulates the grammatical rule corresponding to a hinge proposition is
not being asserted, according to Moyal-Sharrock. It elucidates possible movements within a
language game, but it is not itself a movement in that game. As a grammatical rule, hinge
remains  nonsense  and  ineffable.  The  grammatical  rule  itself  is  not  manifested  by  the
sentence which, in a heuristic context, elucidates or instructs the rule. The rule itself, or
rather  the  certainty  it  embodies,  only  manifests  itself  in  action.  The  sentence  that
articulates a hinge, as Moyal-Sharrock says, “is but the artificial formulation of a certainty
whose defining feature is ineffability” (Moyal-Sharrock, 2004, p. 94).
Finally, hinge propositions are “grammar rules […], which manifest themselves as ways of
acting” (Moyal-Sharrock, 2015, p. 21), are enacted. The grammatical rule that embodies a
certainty  is  manifested  or  shown in  action,  in  the  procedures  and  in  the  way  of
investigating, in what is and is not placed as open to doubt, in what is readily taken as
evidence for or against what and so on. The certainty that the earth has existed for many
years shows itself,  for example, in the practice and willingness to take certain fossils as
evidence that certain animals lived in a certain period in the past; the certainty that I have a
body is manifested in the practical understanding that I do not go through walls, I never try
or even consider trying (Moyal-Sharrock, 2004, p. 67). Similarly, we all try to back away or
protect ourselves when an object is approaching too quickly. This is a disposition that we
even share with several vertebrates and invertebrates (Schiff, 1965). It is in this sense, it is
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suggested,  that  we must understand  Wittgenstein's  claim that  ungrounded grounds are
something animal  and  instinctive  (Wittgenstein,  1969,  §359,  §475).  They manifest  and
show themselves  in  certain ways of acting,  some of  which are  instinctive,  inherited by
natural selection. Others, perhaps most in the human case, are acquired through a process
of enculturation. The certainty that humans have never been on Saturn is one of them. In
any  case,  the  ultimate  grounding for  our  beliefs  is  a  way  of  acting,  an  ingrained  or
instinctive habit of responding to certain circumstances in certain ways. As these ways of
acting are neither true nor false, they can fulfill the role of ungrounded ground. The regress
of justifications does not advance over  ungrounded grounds not only because,  as Hume
would say, nature prevails over skeptical doubts, but, going further, because these enacted
certainties establish the limits of meaning and our procedures for investigating and giving
reasons,  so we can't  even understand what  someone might  be  implying  by saying one
doubts one has a body. This person may even behave like a doubter, but he/she does not
express genuine doubt (1969, §255). Someone like that looks like a half-wit (1969, §257)
or doesn't understand what “body” means, he/she doesn't even know how to play the game
of doubt.4
3. A challenge for the non-propositional interpretation
The challenge I have in mind is not exegetical but thematic. As I indicated at the beginning
of this article, I am not interested in capturing Wittgenstein's position. I'm inspired by On
Certainty and Moyal-Sharrock's  interpretation in order to reach a stance that  I  think is
more cogent. The difficulty I have in mind is the aforementioned problem of demarcation.
Annalisa  Coliva comments that although "I have two hands," "The earth has existed for
many years" and other hinge propositions have the animal and visceral character that non-
propositional interpretation emphasizes, it does not seem to be the case that all examples
4 Although answering the skeptic is not the aim of this paper, it is worthwhile to notice that the common
criticism  that  hinge  propositions  cannot  fulfill  the  role  of  ultimate  ground  because  they  are  devoid  of
epistemic properties (Fogelin, 1994)—they are not even true or false—can be  answered by stressing that
hinge  propositions  stop  the  regress  not  as  ultimate  grounds but  as  doubt  blockers.  In  the  appropriate
contexts, they turn senseless the skeptic doubts that put the regress of justification in movement. If a claim
cannot be reasonable challenged, then a demand for justification will not arise.  Thus, hinge propositions are
not supposed to be what stop a regress already in course but what preclude a regress to begin. 
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of  hinge  propositions  commented  on  by  Wittgenstein  have  this  characteristic,  such  as
“Water boils at 100°c” and “Napoleon won the battle of austerlitz” (Coliva,  forthcoming).
These cases seem to consist of certainties that are too specific and rooted only in certain
communities. A serious relativist threat then arises, as different communities can entrench
different certainties. Wittgenstein himself invites us to imagine the situation of a man “who
had grown up in quite special  circumstances and been taught that the  Earth came into
being 50 years ago” (Wittgenstein, 1969, §262) and who, therefore, firmly maintains that
commitment. To avoid the relativistic threat, it is necessary to find a criterion that allows
demarcating hinge propositions capable of fulfilling the role of  ungrounded ground from
propositions that appear to be hinge but which are too disconnected from the environment
to fulfill this role. Even viscerality seems to be insufficient as a demarcation criterion, since
"people may be viscerally  committed to all  sorts  of  false beliefs,  biases and prejudices,
which we would not thereby want to turn into hinges" (Coliva,  forthcoming). In short, in
order not to fall into relativism, it seems that we cannot be too liberal about which ways of
acting can be ungrounded grounds.
Moyal-Sharrock's position is not completely helpless to deal with this difficulty. While the
talk of ways of acting might lead us to think that ungrounded grounds result from a kind of
tacit behavioral agreement, which could vary as we alternate culture or historical period
within  a  culture,  Moyal-Sharrock  rejects  that  this  is  the  case.  She  maintains  that
grammatical rules are reality-soaked (2021b, p. S418), that they are somehow constrained
by facts of experience and very general facts of nature (2020, p. 48), which would confer an
anchor or stability to ungrounded grounds. For example, the discovery of the fact that men,
and not just women, have something to do with the reproductive process is at the origin of
the  grammatical  rule  “Every  human  being  has  two  biological  parents”  (2020,  p.  47).
Similarly, the concept of “daughterliness”, in the sense of a “loving attention to the integrity
of the daughter-parent relationship” (2021b, p. S418), rests on the practice and experience
of  mutual  attention  and  respect  between  individuals  immediately  related  by  blood  or
adoption.  In  this  way,  facts  about  the  lived  experience  would  also  condition  the
grammatical rules and the limits of meaning. The relationship between grammatical rules
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and the facts of nature or experience is not one of justification, nor could it be, but causal.
As Wittgenstein himself acknowledges, “previous experience may very well be the cause of
my present certitude” (Wittgenstein, 1969, §429), but it is not a reason or ground for it.
These  considerations  still  seem  to  me  to  be  insufficient  to  deal  with  the  problem  of
demarcation. The very distinction between facts of experience and general facts of nature
raises  doubts  about  whether  we  are  faced  with  a  single  or  an  ambiguous  criterion  to
demarcate  ungrounded grounds.  It  seems to me that the second alternative is the  case.
Discourse  about  facts  of  experience  seems  to  be  just  a  different  way  of  talking  about
“regular  ways  of  acting”  (Moyal-Sharrock,  2020,  p.  48),  which  brings  us  back  to  the
relativistic threat. Different communities can  embody the most different regular ways of
acting  and,  therefore,  commit  themselves  to  different  and  irreconcilable  ungrounded
grounds. Moyal-Sharrock could then restrict her approach to the general facts of nature.5
This move is inappropriate for two reasons.  First,  it  would greatly  narrow the range of
ungrounded grounds, although it could be argued that this is the price to pay for avoiding
relativism. Second, as the relationship between facts and certainties or grammatical rules is
causal, they are insufficient to explain  in an intelligible way why certain facts lead us to
certain ungrounded grounds, so that without an explanation of how ungrounded grounds
become reality-soaked, the possibility remains open that any regular way of acting may
turn out to be caused by general facts of nature. 
In a nutshell, I don’t think that facts about our common behavior or general facts about
nature can address the demarcation problem for the simple reason that facts do not have
normative import. The distinction between legitimate and illegitimate  ways of acting for
the role of  ungrounded ground can not be drawn from facts alone.  At the same time, I
emphasize that I do not demand a relation of justification between general facts of nature
5 Or she could appeal to universal patterns of behavior that are cross-cultural, a move that  Moyal-Sharrock
seems to make in her more recent book. Addressing the charge of relativism, Moyal-Sharrock claims that “it is
our universally shared form of life that informs Wittgenstein’s realism by constituting the system of reference
which logically underpins any meaningful account of ourselves and our world” (2021a, p. 177). Given that
different cultures live in different econiches, I do not think that it is helpful to appeal to universal patters of
behavior.  Besides,  facts  about  behavior,  whether  local  or  universal,  will  not  address,  as  I  argue,  the
demarcation problem. They do not have normative import.  
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and regular ways of acting or grammatical rules, but that we manage to articulate a general
explanation of how these things are related. Only then will we be in a position to offer an
answer to the problem of demarcation. The proposal based on abilities—which is a notion
with normative import—offers this explanation and at the same time does not narrow in an
undesirable  way  the  range  of  ungrounded  grounds.  Thus,  we  avoid  relativism  without
losing the richness and even the plurality of ungrounded grounds.
4. The proposal based on abilities
I think it is crucial to find a non-arbitrary delimitation of the ways of acting that fulfill and
can legitimately fulfill  the role of  ungrounded grounds. My proposal is that the ways of
acting  that  constitute  an ability  or  know-how6 are  suitable  for  the  role  of  ungrounded
ground,7 especially if we understand abilities in light of ecological psychology.
4.1 The ecological understanding of abilities
It is common to see ability as something that involves or concerns only the organism. In
this  sense,  the  acquisition of  an ability  is  seen as involving  a  series of  transformations
internal to the organism that then become preponderant in  explanations of its exercises,
both successful and unsuccessful. However, ecological psychology invites us to think in a
different  way.  According  to  ecological  psychology,  the  minimum  unit  of  analysis  and
investigation is the organism-environment system (Richardson et al., 2008, p. 164). This is
due to the fact that organism and environment are complementary (Gibson, 2015, p. 4),
both  the  organism  does  not  survive  without  the  environment  around  it,  and  the
environment  is  something  that  surrounds  an  organism and  is  profoundly  affected  and
6 Although intellectualists such as Williamson and Stanley (2001) question the claim that know-how is a type
of ability, I will not discuss this issue at this point. I discuss it elsewhere (Carvalho, 2020a).
7 Not to be unfair, Moyal-Sharrock makes the connection between ways of acting and know-how in her 2004
book and in later texts, although she explores this connection less and less in more recent works. She says, for
example,  that  “objective  certainty  is  a  know-how  in  which  there  is  no  room  for  improvement”  (Moyal-
Sharrock, 2004, p. 65), that “objective certainty occurs or manifests itself exclusively as a know-how, which,
for philosophical analysis, we depict by articulating into individuated certainties” (2004, p. 68) and that “the
know-how is  the  ground” (2004,  p.  172).  However,  in  addition to not always being emphatic about this
connection,  she  does not  offer  an explanation of  the  connection  itself  and of  what  know-how is,  so  the
problem of demarcation remains present.
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altered by it. According to Gibson, before there were organisms, the earth's surface was a
physical reality, but not an environment in the strict sense. The acquisition of abilities is
then seen  as  a  process  in  which  the  organism adapts  or  tunes  in  to  the  environment
(Carvalho, 2019b), either by reorganizing itself or by changing its environment. More than
that,  the  alterations  internal  to  the  organism should  “be  understood  as  bodily-change-
relative-to-an-environment or, even better, as a change in the extended structure of the
animal–environment system” (Baggs; Raja; Anderson, 2020, p. 2). As also emphasized by
Thomas Fuchs, abilities “can only be described in terms of a relationship of the organism to
its environment” (2018,  p.  101).  Thus,  if  we look at the activity proper to an ability,  it
encompasses both the organism and the environment.
For example, in order to stand up, the child, in addition to having to acquire enough body
strength to overcome gravity,  has to learn to keep his/her center of gravity within the
limits of his/her base of support, which already presupposes an environment, a surface. In
the first stage of learning, the child leans on objects to stand. The object of support imposes
certain  limitations  on  the  child's  possibilities  for  action,  helping  and  facilitating  the
achievement  of  balance.  In  this  new  position,  he/she  is  able  to  explore  visual,  tactile,
vestibular, and proprioceptive information that was not available before. In a subsequent
stage,  the  child  is  able  to  maintain  balance  without  leaning  directly  on  an  object,  but
continues to count on visual information from stable objects in his/her surroundings, as
well  as  proprioceptive  and  vestibular  information,  to  maintain  balance.8 In  this  way,
“postural control extends from the body of the learner to incorporate the solid structures
she encounters in her environment” (Baggs; Raja; Anderson, 2020, p. 3). From an ecological
perspective, abilities involve the environment constitutively.9
8 In a famous experiment (Lee; Aronson, 1974), participants are instructed to stand in a room where the walls
are moving.  In one condition,  the wall  the participants are looking at  is moved towards the participants.
Children are often unable to stand upright, and many adults have to work very hard to stand upright, which
highlights the importance of stability in the surroundings for the ability to stand.
9 Although I have been considering the acquisition of abilities by an individual organism in its environment,
the  ecological  approach  is  not  blind  to  social  factors  that  might  mediate  and  shape  abilities  of social
organisms.  On the contrary,  for  ecological  psychology,  the social  is  a  background  condition not  only  for
evolutionary history of a social species but also for the development of their members (Heft, 2007, p. 93) so
that  a  new  member  with  cooperative  dispositions  enters  in  an  environment  which  is  already  socially
structured. Even an ability so basic as the ability to stand may be socially modulated. For simplicity, I will not
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These considerations from ecological psychology about ability are sufficient to introduce
two general characteristics of abilities that express their normative import. The first is that
abilities are reliably successful, that is, as Alan Millar puts it, “to count as having the ability
to  one must be reliably successful at ing in that in the absence of impediments oneΦ Φ
would nearly always  if one were to act with the intention of ing.”Φ Φ  (Millar, 2016, p. 67).
This trait goes well with an ecological understanding of abilities. The ability to Φ results, as
we have seen, from a process of adaptation and attunement between the organism and its
environment. Successively, ways of acting or possibilities of actions that prove to be more
fruitful for the realization of  Φ are selected, or the environment is modified in order to
make certain possibilities of actions more effective to carry out  Φing. The result of this
process is the coupling between the organism and its environment with regard to  Φ,  so
that  whenever  the  agent  acts  with  the  intention  of  performing  Φ,  if  there  are  no
impediments, he will be successful in performing Φ. Note that the possibilities of actions
are only invested with the function of performing Φ at the end of the learning process that
makes them successful performers of Φ—it is the resulting synergy between organism and
environment that makes them performers of .Φ 10 Thus, the ability to Φ is constituted by a
determined set of action possibilities which, in the appropriate environment and because of
it, are precisely those that perform Φ.
The  second  characteristic  of  abilities  is  that  they  only  manifest  when  the  attempt  to
exercise them is  successful.  It  is  tempting to think that,  once acquired,  abilities  can be
exercised and manifested in environments quite different from their original ones. But this
assumes  precisely  what  the  ecological  perspective  denies:  that  abilities  concern  only
transformations internal to the organism and that the environment does not participate in
address the social factors in the constitution of abilities here. For further discussion of this point, see Heft
(2007) and Carvalho (2020b). I would like to thank Marcos Silva for having called my attention to this issue. 
10 This does not imply that abilities are infallible, at least not in the sense that we would be successful every
time we try to exercise them, a whole host of impediments can lead to attempts to exercise abilities to fail.
Furthermore, some abilities are abilities to do something with a certain success rate (Millar, 2016, p. 70). I
might  be  able,  for  example,  to  hit  50%  of  basketball  tosses  being  in  the  10-foot  range,  while  a  certain
professional  has  the  ability  to  hit  95%  under  the  same  conditions.  These  are  abilities  that  manifest
themselves over time, every 100 moves I get 50 right, the professional gets 95. The failed particular moves
are not in themselves manifestations of this type of ability, but are part of a series of moves that together
manifest an ability that has a certain success rate.
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their constitution  and  manifestation.  On  the  contrary,  abilities require  a  cooperation
between environment and organism. No one manifests the ability to stand while, lying on a
bed, dreams to stand. The very act of standing requires a body, a surface and gravity to
overcome. Exercising an ability is, to echo Dewey, as truly an act of the environment as of
the person, it is something “done by the environment by means of organic structures or
acquired dispositions” (Dewey, 1922, p. 14). Abilities “are ways of using and incorporating
the environment in which the latter has its say as surely as the former” (1922, p. 15). The
manifestation  of  the  ability  to  Φ occurs  precisely  when  organism  and  environment
cooperate and together perform  Φ,  it  is  an event of the organism-environment system.
Thus, the exercises of an ability are, to use Ryle's expression, well captured by “success
verbs” (2009, p. 130), that is, verbs that indicate the attainment of a state of affairs.
4.2 Hinge propositions as ways of acting that constitute abilities
The criterion for legitimate ways of actions can be state as follows: a way of acting play the
role of an ungrounded ground if it is part of a set of ways of acting that constitute an ability.
Any ability? In principle, yes, because any ability extends the range of actions that can be
reliably  performed  by  the  agent,  incorporating  aspects  or  parts  of  her  environment.
Abilities anchor us in the world, providing a ground on which to support our investigations
and knowledge claims. The very ability to stand up already embodies or acts the hinge
proposition that I have a body—this proposition is enacted by the ability to control my
body  in  order  to  stand.  The  hinge  proposition  that  there  are  people  other  than me  is
embedded in the diverse repertoire of abilities that  allow me to follow the skillful  and
intelligent behaviors that others manifest around me. As I watch someone riding a bicycle, I
am able to tell whether their way of riding a bicycle expresses dexterity or inexperience. I
distinguish the rude or polite way in which someone addresses me. I note and follow with
admiration the shrewd agility of professional dancers. In all these cases, the exercise of my
behavior-following  abilities,  by  tracking  mental  qualities  such  as  dexterity,  sensitivity,
intelligence,  and agility, manifests or  enacts the hinge proposition that there are people
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other than me. These abilities embody the most salient dimensions of mindeness and our
intersubjective world.11
We acquire  abilities  to  follow and accompany behaviors,  that  is,  discriminate  them for
agility,  dexterity,  intelligence,  sensitivity,  etc.,  long  before  we  are  able  to  make  skillful
claims about how well someone performs a particular action. A child who already knows
how to ride a bicycle is relatively able to observe whether another person is riding a bicycle
well or poorly,  which  she may express by admiring the dexterity of a rider but not the
inexperience of another, without necessarily being able to say why. The ability to make
claims, including knowledge claims, about whether and how someone is acting sensitively,
intelligently,  or  nimbly  is  one  that  comes  later  and  builds  on  the  abilities  to  follow
behaviors. The latter provide the background of intelligibility from which specific questions
about one's personhood, mindeness, particular mental qualities, etc., can be asked, may be
raised  and  investigated.  The  general  doubt  about  whether  there  are  other  people  or
whether there is any other mind besides our own is one that doesn't make sense, it doesn't
form—the attempt to raise it  clashes with this set of abilities to follow and accompany
behaviors that even mediate our tacit understanding of what it is to be a person and to
have a mind.12 Through these abilities the human bodies that surround us and with which
we interact are already revealed to us and given as skillful, smart, sensitive, conscientious,
11 Maclaren, commenting on Merleau-Ponty's example of the spectator of a football match, states that he not
only watches “the game, but follows it in a bodily way, anticipating and completing the moves of the athletes
through   the  jerks,  dodges  and  half-kick  motions  of  his  own  body”  (2002,  p.  190).  It  is  through  this
accompaniment that we enter and inhabit the intersubjective world, “it is by virtue of being swept up in the
other’s bodily attitude, in her bodily intending of the world, that we are ushered into a shared world” (2002,
p. 191).
12 On another occasion I argued that our sensorimotor abilities give us direct access and an understanding of
the nature of objects around us in the sense that the perceived object “is not simply given to us, it is presented
as  being  in  a  certain  way,  i.e.,  as  being  an  object  that  requires  or  permits  a  series  of  affordances.  This
understanding is not yet propositional, but it is rich enough to say that the object and its properties are [...]
situated in the space of actions” (Carvalho, 2016, p. 516). Perceiving an object is placing it in what I then
called the space of actions. I then argued that this perceptual-practical understanding of objects provides the
necessary  paradigmatic  cases  for  introducing  observational  concepts,  thus  showing  how  propositional
thinking relies upon the world of action possibilities that we inhabit through our sensorimotor abilities. 
14
intelligent, etc. In fact, under normal conditions, it is not possible to see them or face them
as mere bodies.13
Certainly,  there  may  be  situations  where  we  are  no  longer  able  or  have  difficulty  in
recognizing a particular person in a human body. Faced with a person with an advanced
stage of Alzheimer's, it can be difficult to follow their behavior, which is less and less able to
have and manifest mental qualities. We can have doubts if the person is still “there”. Doubts
that can be resolved by someone better positioned than us. In the film “Still Alice” (2015),
we  follow  the  evolution  of  Alzheimer's  in  the  character  Alice,  a  renowned  linguistics
professor. In the more advanced stage, when she has almost completely lost her memory,
her linguistic abilities, and her motor routines are weakened, people farther away might
wonder  whether  there is still something of Alice in that body. Although there is no such
scene, I can imagine her daughter, who accompanies her through this final stage, replying “I
know my mother is still there” or something of that sort. The fact is, both still manage to
engage emotionally with subtlety and depth. In a possible reading, the film suggests that it
is only at this moment that they  were able to resolve,  on a deeper emotional level,  old
issues and disagreements between them. Commenting on our tacit knowledge of the other,
especially in the case of dementia, de Jaegher delicately points out:
when you are close to a person with dementia, emotional connection is one of the
things that remains the longest. Sitting on a park bench together watching the birds
and the weather go by can be moments of great significance. You know this in your
eye  contact,  through  touch,  by  embracing.  In  fact,  when  all  else  is  gone,  often
practically the only way you know how things are with the person is through your
emotional connection. (de Jaegher, 2019)
Thus,  from  the  vantage  point  and  the  emotional  affinity  gained  by  the  more  intimate
dealings and  interactions, Alice's daughter may be in a position to know something that
other people cannot, that her mother is still there. The knowledge claim "I know my mom is
still there" is one she could legitimately make based on a set of emotional abilities that put
13 For lack of space, I cannot argue for this claim here. In order to avoid the common charge that perceiving
the behavior is not the same as perceiving a mental aspect, one can appeal to Ryle’s adverbialism regarding
mental states. Mental states or attributes are ways of behaving. A less stringent account according to which
patterns and ways of behaving constitute at least in part mental states or attributes will also suffice to claim
that we directly perceive mental states or attributes by tracking ways of behaving. For a rich and detailed
discussion of this issue, see Laura Danón and Daniel Kalpokas (2017). 
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her in touch with what's left of Alice. And it would make sense, Alice's daughter would be
providing valuable information. In any case, from the acknowledgment of the possibility of
doubt in this particular case does not follow the legitimacy and intelligibility of the general
doubt about the existence of other minds.
The examples could be multiplied, but they would illustrate the same general consideration
that  hinge  propositions  are  ways  of  acting  that  constitute  abilities  that  form  the
background upon which the practices of investigating and making knowledge claims rest,
not only conferring meaning to these practices but also imposing intelligibility restrictions
on them. Abilities gives us a world in relation to which we can raise questions and start an
investigation.14 Ecologically understood, these abilities involve both the organism and the
environment, they are, to use Moyal-Sharrock's phrase again, reality-soaked. But we now
have an explanation of why they are reality-soaked. Abilities are not just related to the
organism. The outcome of the adaptation process and/or alteration of the environment
that gives rise to them is the coupling between organism and environment. It is the synergy
of both that is manifested in the exercise of an ability.
The proposal based on abilities also offers an explanation of why the ways of acting that
constitute  abilities  can  fulfill  the  role  of  ungrounded  grounds.  Given  the  two
aforementioned characteristics of abilities, that they are reliably successful and that they
only manifest when attempts to exercise them are successful, abilities establish the most
immediate  contact  with  the  environment  about  which  investigative  and  practices  of
claiming knowledge can be settled.  Abilities lack a ground.  Instead,  as they are reality-
soaked or constitutively involve  the environment,  they provide an ungrounded ground.
While  exercising  our  abilities,  such as  the  ability  to  stand  or  follow behaviors,  we  are
immersed respectively in the physical and social environment.
14 In this sense, there is a harmony between my proposal and Ryle's claim that knowing-how is logically prior
to  propositional  knowledge  (1946,  p.  4-5),  the  scientist,  he  says,  “is  primarily  a  knower-how  and  only
secondarily a knower-that” (1946, p. 16). On another occasion, I took advantage of the priority of knowing-
how to defend a unified approach to knowledge and understanding that dispenses with the requirement of
reflexivity for the possession of knowledge/understanding of something. This requirement is relevant only in
specific situations and tasks, as in the practice of claiming knowledge where the agent's credibility is at stake.
As Austin points out, when one says “‘I know’, I give others my word: I give others my authority for saying 'S
is P'” (1970, p. 99). In these cases, the agent has to know how to justify himself. See Carvalho (2018a).
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This  also explains  the strangeness  of  the utterance of  hinge propositions—they do not
bring  any  information  that  was  not  already  involved  in  the  exercise  of  these  most
fundamental abilities. For those who inhabit the social world through the ability to follow
and accompany behaviors,  the  assertion  that  there  are  other  people  or  other  minds is
counterproductive. Furthermore, as I have already pointed out, the minimal understanding
of what it is to be a person or to have a mind is mediated by these abilities, so that general
formulations  such as  "There  are  other  people"  or  "There  are  no  other  minds"  already
assume what is intended respectively to state or deny. However, I do not commit, as Moyal-
Sharrock does, to the claim that hinge propositions are ineffable and that they are senseless
because they are not bipolar. I agree that, in normal contexts,  uttering them is out of the
question, we frustrate both the purpose of informing by affirming a hinge proposition and
of  refuting  by  denying  a  hinge  proposition.  But  that  does  not  mean  that  we  cannot
articulate the regularities and rules that are observed by abilities. For example, one would
expect that the ability to discriminate how to nimbly ride a bicycle responds to a certain way
or a delimited set  of  ways to ride  a  bicycle.  There is  no reason why these regularities
cannot  be  described—abilities  are  not  some  kind  of  ineffable  reality.  In  any  case,  the
explicit articulation of these regularities or rules is both unnecessary and insufficient for
the  possession  of  the  ability.  In  this  respect,  I  agree  with  Moyal-Sharrock  that  hinge
propositions are enacted, we show that we observe a certain regularity in practice, when
exercising the corresponding ability. To borrow a formulation from  Ryle, if  there is any
sense in which we “know” these rules or regularities it is “in the executive way  of being
able to apply them” (Ryle, 2009, p. 30) or to observe them. There is, therefore, a practical
dimension  of  abilities  that  is  not  reduced  to  the  theoretical  apprehension  of  any
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proposition.15 On the contrary, as  Wittgenstein observes, “it is our (skillful)  acting, which
lies at the bottom of the language-game” (Wittgenstein, 1969, §204, my addition).16
4.3 Defusing the demarcation problem
The proposal based on abilities offers a promising way to defuse the demarcation problem.
The proposal only selects ways of acting that are part of abilities that, by virtue of the way
they  are  constituted,  according  to  the  ecological  approach outlined  herein,  involve  the
environment or are imbued with reality. Thus, one must avoid selecting a way of acting that
is  disconnected from the  environment  as  one  that  could fulfill  the  role  of  ungrounded
ground. Coliva's justifiable fear, let us remember, is that people can be viscerally committed
to all kinds of false beliefs—Wittgenstein himself illustrated this possibility with the case of
the subject who is committed to the hinge proposition that the Earth exists for 50 years just
because of the way he was brought up. This commitment cannot be part of the historical
and archeological abilities that put us in touch with our most distant past, nor does it need
to be such a distant past. Consider, for example, the past of a generation ago, transmitted
orally from father to son. Thus, this commitment cannot legitimately fulfill the role of an
ungrounded ground, even if it is a visceral commitment of the subject in question.
15 In the parallel  discussion  on know-how, intellectualists such as Stanley and Williamson argue that the
practical dimension of know-how can be captured by the notion of a practical mode of presentation, a way of
apprehending  a  propositional  content  that  would  be  inseparable  from  the  assimilation  of  a  series  of
behavioral dispositions. As they put it, thinking of a way to act, for example, a way in which someone would
be able to  ride a bicycle,  “under a practical  mode of  presentation undoubtedly entails  the possession of
certain complex dispositions” (Stanley; Willlamson, 2001, p. 429). Without going into the question of whether
this notion of practical mode of presentation might not be smuggling the notion of ability that intellectualists
refuse to be essential to explaining the nature of know-how, the central point is that they acknowledge that
know-how cannot to be equated with the merely theoretical apprehension of a proposition. Adjusted to my
discussion, abilities couldn't either.
16 In a similar manner, Michael Polanyi claims that there is a sense in which the pre-suppositions of science,
which turn experimentation and the interpretation of experiments possible, cannot be asserted. We dwell in
those pre-suppositions in order to  investigate the world  in the same way we dwell  in our own body to
perceive the world around. We perceive the world with the lived body without paying attention to it. Polanyi
would add that this dimension that is  not reducible to the theoretical  grasp of  a proposition is not only
practical but also personal: "This making sense of experience," made possible by the embodiment of the pre-
suppositions of science, "is a skillful act which impresses the personal participation of the scientist on the
resultant knowledge" (1958/2005, p. 62).
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Furthermore, to remain faithful and consistent with the hinge proposition that the Earth
came into existence only 50 years ago, this person would have to automatically dismiss as
false or delusional any reports of people over 60 about their lives and experiences when
they were less than 10 years old, or more than 70 when they were less than 20 years old,
and so on. The commitment to our usual mnemonic, historical, and archaeological abilities
and all that it implies is so entrenched that it's even difficult to fully imagine the possibility
of this  subject and his entire community maintaining the commitment that the Earth has
only existed for 50 years.
Even if it is possible for a community to consistently maintain the commitment that the
Earth has only existed for 50 years, that commitment is not a legitimate  grounding  as it
comes  into  tension  with  mnemonic,  historical,  and  archaeological  abilities.  Such  a
commitment would imply the rejection of the scope of those abilities. An alternative would
be to view this community as having narrower or more limited mnemonic, historical, and
archeological  abilities  than ours,  just  as  a  basketball  apprentice  has  narrower or  more
limited hoop abilities than a professional player. This community could only reach into the
recent past,  while  we are  able to dig into the more distant past.  If  we understand the
situation  in  this  way,  then  there  is  no  tension  between  the  historical  abilities  of  this
community and ours, there is just a difference in scope or reach. In this case, the hinge
proposition that seeks to articulate their ability needs to be reformulated, something like
“The Earth has  been around for  at  least  50 years”.  This  indeed could fulfill  the role  of
ungrounded ground, and would not raise any tension between them and us.
This discussion allows me to observe two interesting consequences of the proposal based
on abilities: (1) some hinge propositions may be more fundamental than others and (2)
some  hinge  propositions  may  be  local  and  therefore  we  can  have  diversity  of  hinges
without relativism. As for (1),  let us observe that the abilities maintain relationships of
dependence among themselves. To learn to walk, a bipedal animal must first learn to stand.
This last ability is therefore more fundamental than the first. Thus, the commitment "I have
a body that stands upright" is more fundamental than "I have a body that moves," which,
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incidentally,  may  not  be  fundamental  for  someone  with  locked-in syndrome  and  who,
therefore, has lost the ability to move around. As one is still able to control one's eyebrows,
the even more fundamental  “I  have a body” commitment remains.  Similarly,  mnemonic
abilities are more basic than historical and archeological abilities. The latter take us even
further  into  the  past  than the  former,  but  they cannot  do  so without  basic  mnemonic
abilities. Is there, however, a single hinge proposition more fundamental than any other? I
don't think I need to take sides on this issue. It may be that we have a relatively broad set of
core abilities that don't depend on each other. They will then be equally fundamental, as
well as the hinge propositions that articulate them. And if there is a single one on which all
the others depend, without it depending on them, this will not eliminate the fact that the
others,  insofar as they incorporate the environment, will further expand the organism's
contact with its surroundings. To fulfill the  ungrounded ground role, it is enough to be a
way of acting that constitutes an ability, it does not need to be the most basic ability, if
there is only one.
These considerations also lead us directly to the (2) second consequence.  Very specific
abilities,  shared  only,  for  example,  by  experts  in  a  subject,  do  exhibit  the  same
characteristics as other abilities and can therefore, at least for individuals who share these
abilities, serve as a basis for further practices investigation and knowledge claim. Think, for
example,  of  the  set  of  instrumental  abilities  that  experimental  physicists  share  that
underpin  the  investigation  of  more  specific  physical  theories  and  hypotheses.  Reliable
handling of a range of instruments allows them to reach out and be in touch with a range of
phenomena that for most of us are beyond our unaided perception. For example, given the
abilities  not  only  to  observe,  by  handling  a  series  of  instruments,  but  also  to  control
electrons for the construction of electron guns, i would venture to say, extrapolating a little
from the hacking motto “if you can spray them, then they are real” (Hacking, 2012, p. 82),17
17 With  this  motto,  Hacking introduces  what  has  come  to  be  called  entity  realism,  the  thesis  that  many
theoretical  entities do exist,  even if  theories about  those entities turn out to be false.  The  grounding for
vindicating the existence of electrons is the ability to intervene on them, see Hacking (2012). My suggestion
here, based on the ecological understanding of abilities, is to go a step further and say that if you can spray
them, it's no longer a question of whether or not they exist, whether or not whatever you can spray is real.
What you spray has already been incorporated by your spraying ability. According to my approach, it doesn’t
matter that physicists continue to debate whether electrons are particles, fields or even a strange kind of
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that for most of today's physicists “There are electrons” is a hinge proposition, electrons
are already incorporated in the abilities of today's physicists. It is no longer something to
be  discovered.  Decades  of  interaction  between  the  community  of  physicists  and  the
electrons,  mediated  by  a  series  of  instruments,  allowed  to  gradually  select  successful
interventions for the control of electrons, so that in the end, the community of physicists
acquired  the  ability  to  manipulate  them  in  very  specific  ways.  In  my  case,  I  need  the
testimony of physicists about what they are capable of doing with electrons to come to
believe that they exist; “There are electrons” is not, for me, a hinge proposition. It is in this
sense  that  we  say  that  some  hinge  propositions  are  local,  they  can  play  the  role  of
ungrounded ground only for the narrowest group of people who have the specific abilities
that embody them. As different groups can specialize and adapt to different portions of the
environment,  thus acquiring different sets of  abilities,  we can have a diversity of  hinge
propositions, but not relativism. All abilities and their respective hinge propositions are
reality-soaked.  Thus,  the  examples  that  Coliva  contested  as  cases  of  genuine  hinge
propositions, such as “Water boils at 100°C” and “Napoleon won the battle of Austerlitz”,
can be reinterpreted within my approach as local hinge propositions, that is, as constituting
the abilities of specialists.
5. Final considerations
In this article, I relied on Moyal-Sharrock's interpretation that hinge propositions are ways
of acting, as a way to offer a unique proposal on how to understand these propositions. I
have argued that Moyal-Sharrock’s  interpretation leaves a few gaps, as her interpretation
does not explain the origin of our ungrounded grounds, and because it does not provide an
adequate answer to the problem of demarcation, it is also not sufficiently resilient to the
relativistic  threat.  I  then suggested that  hinge propositions are  ways of  acting that  are
fuzzy entity. Whatever they are, we already know to a great extent how to deal with them.  Thus, despite the
theoretical disagreement among physicists about the nature of electrons, they share manipulatory abilities
that allow them to control and intervene on electrons. The hinge proposition “There are electrons”, which is
not a proposition per se, is embodied in these abilities. I’m grateful to Otavio Bueno and Tiago Trajan for
having raised a few concerns regarding this point  in the “Sobre a Certeza” workshop, organized by Marcos
Silva, where I presented a first version of this work. 
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constitutive  of  abilities.  Furthermore,  I  articulated  an  ecological  approach  to  abilities,
which enabled me to explain in a unified way why abilities are reality-soaked. Based on this
approach,  I  have provided an answer to the problem of  demarcation that  removes the
relativistic threat.
I said that skepticism was not the aim of this paper, but I would like to finish by making a
few comments on this issue. I'm sure my skeptical friends who have accompanied me here
will tell you that their skeptical doubts remain intact. They weren't shaken by anything I
said.  They  might  even add  that  the  anti-skeptical  consequences  I  draw depend  on the
ecological “hypothesis” of abilities I haven't tried. In the best-case scenario, I've made only
one conditional: if abilities are reality-soaked, as the ecological reading suggests, then we
have several  ungrounded grounds that  are exempt from doubt. But where is the proof or
evidence for the  antecedent of  this  conditional?  I  have two comments to make on this
interpellation.  The first  is  that,  as  I  said  at  the beginning of the  text,  I  am much more
concerned  with  explanation  than  justification.  I  have  sought  to  provide  a  coherent
explanation for the many ungrounded grounds that we legitimately accept.18 As Zagzebski
emphasizes so well, understanding and certainty are two distinct epistemic values, and, in
different periods, epistemology has been more concerned with one than the other (2009, p.
5–6). One could say that I'm concerned with both, but mostly with understanding the tacit
certainty we share in everyday life. My second comment is that I don't need to prove the
antecedent of the above conditional,  not because, like Moore, I'd like to say that I know
without  proof  that  it's  true,  but  because  the  doubt  that  all  of  our  abilities  could  be
disconnected from reality is one that doesn't make sense—we can't raise it.
18 Another way of putting the adopted strategy is to say that I offered, in Goodman's terms, a constructive
definition—what Carnap called an explication—of "ungrounded ground." Such a definition cannot completely
depart from what is entrenched as ungrounded ground, but at the same time, insofar as it results from the
reflective equilibrium between general principles regarding ungrounded grounds—the ecological approach—
and the normally accepted cases of ungrounded ground, the definition thus obtained allows us to distinguish
legitimate  ungrounded  grounds from  non-legitimate  ones.  For  a  more  detailed  analysis  of  Goodman's
strategy, see Carvalho (2018b).
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